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Abstract 
At present, the average homicide clearance rate in the United States is approximately 65 percent; 
down roughly 15 percent from the mid-1970s.  This research seeks to inform how police can best 
improve homicide clearance rates by identifying best practices in homicide investigations.  To 
accomplish this goal, as part of a federally-funded project, seven geographically representative 
law enforcement agencies were identified that had at least 24 homicides in 2011 and had a 
clearance rate of 80 percent or higher from which effective investigative practices could be 
gleaned.  Qualitative findings indicate that a strong community policing presence, collaboration 
with external agencies, and an innovative culture facilitate high rates of homicide clearance. 
Implications for policy and future research are discussed. 
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Effective Police Homicide Investigations: 
Evidence from Seven Cities with High Clearance Rates 
 
Introduction 
 The prevalence of homicide in American society continues to perplex citizens, 
legislators, policy makers and police officials.  Occasionally horrific events – such as Newtown, 
Connecticut and Aurora, Colorado – place a national focus on homicide; in these cases it was 
mass homicides.  Ironically, according to the Uniform Crime Report, the average number of 
homicides occurring on a daily basis (slightly over forty homicides per day in the U.S. in 2011) 
surpasses the deaths that occurred in these horrific mass incidents, yet many of these daily 
homicides receive relatively little attention beyond the local media market.  The good news is 
that the numbers of homicides have continued to drop over the past several years, however, the 
numbers of victims still remains high; there were 16,799 homicides in the U.S. in 2011 (Cooper 
& Smith, 2011) at the time this research was conducted.  While the frequency of homicide is 
dropping, with presumably lower caseloads for homicide investigators, clearance rates have also 
been on a steady decline since the 1960s with a current average clearance rate hovering around 
61 percent (Roberts & Lyons, 2011); hence fewer homicide offenders are being identified and 
arrested.  
A litany of studies exists that examine the complex nature of homicide, its victims, and 
its offenders.  Collectively these studies provide new insights to understand the problem.  The 
challenge is to take this knowledge of homicide characteristics and trends and integrate it with 
new and emerging police strategies, practices, and technology.  By transcending theory to policy, 
the obvious goal would be to clear more homicide cases.  A hopeful artifact would be to prevent 
future homicides from occurring.  The challenge is not simply to apply a new technology or 
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implement a promising practice.  Rather, the need is to re-examine the role of the homicide 
investigator and the methodology of homicide investigations.  Many proven investigation 
techniques will still apply but through a different paradigm to make them more effective with 
new insight about the application of the technique.  In addition, new techniques and a new 
organizational philosophy of homicide investigations may help increase the effectiveness of 
these inquiries – and thus is the focus of the present research. 
Homicide clearances are categorized into one of three mutually exclusive categories.  
They are cleared by arrest, exceptional clearance, and un-cleared (Jarvis & Regoeczi, 2009).  
Scholars seeking to delineate differences within each of these categories have parsed them 
further into four operationalizations.  A discussion of these operationalizations is not pertinent to 
the current study, and can be reviewed further in the work of Riedel (2008) as well as Lundman 
and Myers (2012). What is relevant to the current research is that the findings of the latter study 
indicate there are no differences of clearance rates across these mutually exclusive categories and 
extralegal victim characteristics (i.e. victim race and incident location).  As will be discussed in 
more detail, the literature lends support for the notion that police investigate homicides 
equitably.  Despite this generally held belief, little scholarly attention has been paid to the actual 
work the police do to clear homicide cases (the most impressive study to date is Keel et al., 
2009). As Puckett and Lundman (2003, p. 188) note:  
“Researchers need to gain access to police departments open to research and then use that 
access to explore the effects of the investigative actions of detectives on homicide 
clearances…the present research remain[s] largely silent on the effects of the 
investigative actions... Much therefore remains to be learned about what detectives do 
and how what they do affects clearances.”  
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The present research seeks to fill this knowledge gap by utilizing observations from seven cities 
in the United States with high homicide clearance rates and effective homicide investigative 
practice to inform practitioners and guide future research in this area.  
 
Homicide Clearance Rates  
Factors that affect homicide clearance rates is perhaps the most under-represented aspect 
of the homicide literature.  To date, homicide clearance research has focused predominantly on 
two competing perspectives.  Black’s theory of law (1976) contends that police exercise their 
discretion to clear incidents of homicide based on extralegal characteristics of victims and the 
areas in which the crime occurred. Conversely, other scholars argue that homicide is the most 
serious crime and all police work diligently to clear every case, regardless of victim 
characteristics or where the crime occurred (Gottfredson & Hindelang, 1979; Klinger, 1997).  
Though findings lack consensus, in aggregate the research has shown that extralegal 
characteristics of victims, as well as the location of their homicide, do not influence clearance 
rates (Addington, 2006; Litwin, 2004; Marche, 1994; Puckett & Lundman, 2003; Regoeczi et al., 
2000; Riedel & Rinehart, 1996; Wellford & Cronin, 1999).  This collective evidence lends 
support to the notion that police treat investigations of homicide equally – that is, overall police 
use comparable diligence in all homicide investigations.  However, the equitable application of 
due diligence by police to solve homicides does not inform how police actually clear such 
incidents.  A focus on the daily operational aspects of police homicide investigations should 
yield insightful information.  
To this end, studies have examined the effects of detective experience and workload on 
homicide clearances; yielding mixed results.  Homicide is the offense type most likely to be 
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influenced by available resources to investigate (Greenwood et al., 1977; Marche, 1994) while 
other findings have rebutted that such a relationship exists (Keel et al., 2009; Litwin & Xu, 
2007).  Using arguably the most robust sample of cases and specified modeling, Puckett and 
Lundman (2003) found no relationship between detective experience, as well as detective 
workload, and homicide clearance rates. Their results also indicated that new homicide 
detectives, who are assigned to work under the guidance of an experienced detective that have 
primary responsibility of the case, demonstrated no significant differences in clearance rates of 
homicide as compared to detectives with more experience in the homicide unit.  Perhaps aiding 
in the explanation of these null findings is that homicide investigators in large cities are 
experienced police officers who progressed from patrolling the streets to less visible detective 
units prior to being assigned to the homicide unit (Rachlin, 1995).  Interestingly, this line of 
research has eluded the notion that detective caseload could mask other organizational resource 
limitations – such as adequate staffing – that in turn result in decreased response time to 
homicide scenes and the number of available detectives to gather evidence and witness testimony 
(Keel et al., 2009; Litwin & Xu, 2007; Wellford & Cronin, 1999). 
Extant research has identified two sets of factors that influence the effectiveness of police 
to clear homicides.  The first set are physical attributes of the homicide incident such as the 
availability of physical evidence resulting from the incident and the method (i.e. firearm or knife) 
of committing the homicide (Litwin, 2004; Litwin & Xu, 2007; Puckett & Lundman, 2003; 
Regoeczi et al. 2000; Riedel & Rinehart, 1996; Wellford & Cronin, 1999). More salient to the 
current study is the second set of factors that can be attributed to the community in which the 
homicide incident occurred.  Research has demonstrated that successful homicide investigations 
rely on information from witnesses to the crime as well as information from other witnesses and 
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citizens who reside in the crime area that can inform detectives about victims and potential 
violators (Greenwood et al., 1977; Litwin, 2004; Reiss, 1971; Riedel & Rinehart, 1996). 
However, witnesses may be less likely to cooperate with a police investigation for fear of 
retaliation (Riedel & Jarvis, 1999) or a lack of trust in the police (Kane, 2005; Puckett & 
Lundman, 2003; Regoecvzi & Jarvis, 2013; Warner, 2007).  Police can build trust with citizens, 
reinforce legitimacy, and reduce fear of crime generally, and retaliation specifically, through an 
effective community policing approach (Brookman & Innes, 2013).  Evidence also suggests that 
community policing improves police investigations (Skogan et al., 1999) and can have a 
violence prevention affect (Kenney et al., 2010; White et al., 2003).  Incorporating observations 
of community policing and police investigative processes is the next logical step in the 
explanation of homicide clearance rates; a step the present research provides. 
Since the terrorists attacks of September 11, 2001, significant strides have been made 
with respect to law enforcement intelligence and the sharing of information across jurisdictions 
(Chermak et al., 2013).  Improved practices and standards for analyzing and sharing information 
have been articulated throughout multiple federal publications (Carter & Carter, 2009a) and the 
creation of fusion centers has enhanced law enforcement’s infrastructure to share analytic 
products (Carter & Carter, 2009b).  This analytic capability, coupled with existing analytic 
methods commonly found within forensics (i.e. DNA testing and blood spatter patterns), has 
been found to improve homicide clearance rates (Wellford & Cronin, 1999; Keel et al., 2009; 
Roberts, 2007).  Given the rather recent integration of intelligence-led policing within agencies 
in the U.S. (Carter, Phillips & Gayadeen, 2014), research has yet to explore the implications of 
this emerging philosophy for homicide investigations and clearance rates.  
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A review of the literature relevant to explaining homicide clearance rates has revealed 
that a gap exists with respect to what is known about how police investigative processes can 
influence rates of clearance.  Building on the work of Keel and his colleagues (2009), the present 
research seeks to identify strategies and tactics of successful police homicide investigations.  
Jarvis and Regoeczi (2009, p. 185) note why such a focused examination is needed:  
“[NIBRS]… data lack detailed information on some of the investigative and procedural 
aspects of homicide investigations (i.e., the availability of witnesses, police response 
times, number of detectives assigned to the case, and other details). Such data would 
improve efforts to understanding homicide solvability.” 
 
Methodology 
This is qualitative research based on extensive interviewing of a wide variety of police 
personnel over a four year period who directly investigate homicides and those law enforcement 
personnel (sworn and non-sworn) who provide investigative support.  This approach is consistent 
with Jack Greene’s (2014) solicitation to his peers for more qualitative and contextualized 
insights from complex police processes that cannot be fully captured through traditional 
quantitative modeling.  The information was derived from four Bureau of Justice Assistance 
(BJA) projects where the first author was directly involved in the interviews.1  The projects were 
not originally conceived by BJA as being an integrated series of violence control projects.  
Rather, they originally started with Project 1 as a Training and Technical Assistance program for 
violence reduction.  As a result of these findings, coupled with external initiatives of the Justice 
Department’s Civil Rights Division, Projects 2 and 3 were developed, in part to apply the lessons 
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learned from Project 1.  Based on additional lessons learned from Projects 2 and 3, Project 4 was 
developed.   
Admittedly, an ideal research project would have been conceptualized differently.  
However, federal Training and Technical Assistance projects rarely follow preferred research 
protocols.  Moreover, this approach does not negate the fact that experimentation was performed 
in law enforcement agencies from which important new knowledge was learned.  The qualitative 
methodology employed was derived from the quantitative findings of Keel and his colleagues 
(2009).  Specifically, Keel was consulted on these projects to share his data for purposes of 
identifying factors most important to homicide investigations that should be examined through 
in-depth interviews to provide the much-needed context of how these practices work.  Given the 
fidelity of how investigations are managed across agencies, such context allows for the 
identification of factors that facilitate and inhibit successful clearances.  The authors have been 
able to control some variables and record the findings through in-depth interviews to provide 
contemporary policy insights for homicide investigation.  Each project is described below from a 
methodological perspective. 
 
Project 1 
In 2007 the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) created the Targeting Violent Crime 
Initiative (TVCI) wherein a competitive solicitation was released for police departments to 
develop a violence reduction program using intelligence-led policing (ILP).  There were one-
hundred-three funding awards made – while all had to be some type of violence reduction 
program, some of the awards expressly focused on homicide reduction.  All grantees were 
required to have a project team of managers, analysts, officers, and investigators to participate in 
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a conference that provided training and held discussion sessions where grantees described their 
projects and solicited input on ways to refine their crime control initiatives. 
The projects were closely monitored.  After eighteen months, not surprisingly, many of 
the projects had little or no success.  However, ten projects were identified that had significant 
successes in reducing violence (see Bureau of Justice Assistance, 2012).  These agencies were 
selected by BJA for a detailed assessment to understand how the project worked, its key 
components and results.  A team then visited the agencies to learn in greater detail about the 
projects’ implementation and effects.  This paper reports the successful projects that addressed 
homicide from a perspective of new policy applications. 
 
Projects 2 and 3  
Under a BJA Training and Technical Assistance (TTA) program, these two major law 
enforcement agencies requested that BJA provide an assessment of their homicide investigations 
due to the agencies’ lack of success in effectively clearing homicide cases.  The jurisdiction in 
Project 2 (with a population of approximately 344,000) had a homicide rate of 33.1 per 100,000 
with a clearance rate of 35 percent.  The agency in Project 3 (with an approximate population of 
4,000,000 in the jurisdiction) had a homicide rate of 29.4 per 100,000 with a clearance rate of 22 
percent.  A team of five experienced homicide investigators, one forensics specialists, the BJA 
project monitor, a logistics officer and the first author as team leader made four, one week site 
visits to each agency reviewing records, policies, operational procedures and conducting 
extensive interviews with critical personnel (it is estimated there were about 445 hours of 
interviews with each agency.)  While there were some unique issues with each agency that 
contributed to their lack of success, each agency also had stark failures that were largely 
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consistent between the agencies.  These ranged from their philosophical approach of policing to 
the failure to effectively perform specific investigative techniques and strategies. 
The problems and failures found in each agency were independently documented by the 
assessment team.  Following each assessment visit, the team met to discuss findings, issues and 
next steps.  Based on the collective discussions and conference calls, the findings and 
recommendations were drafted.  The team then met again to discuss each finding and 
recommendation similar to a Delphi panel.  There was a clear consensus on the conclusions and 
recommendations – indeed; nearly all reported findings were unanimous by the team members. 
Extensive recommendations were made to each agency on changes that could increase the 
efficacy of homicide investigations.  BJA also provided a homicide investigation training 
program based on the needs defined in the recommendations. 
 
Project 4 
Based on the results of projects 1, 2 and 3, preliminary findings suggested that clearance 
rates of homicides were significantly influenced by (1) actions taken in the first forty-eight to 
seventy-two hours following the report of the homicide2 and (2) specific types of investigative 
activity that were used by the agencies.  However, there were some findings for which the 
implications were not fully explained.  For example, while most of the successful agencies 
tended to have some unique investigative approaches, they also used traditional approaches to 
investigations with greater success than the poorer performing agencies.  While suppositions 
could be made why this occurred, more information was clearly needed to understand the 
successes.  In order to explain these actions better and to identify other successes in homicide 
investigations, BJA instituted the “Homicide Process Mapping Project”.  Seven cities and 
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counties were identified that had twenty-five or more homicides per year (most had far more) 
and a clearance rate of 80 percent or higher.3 
Team members who participated in Projects 2 and 3 performed site visits at each of the 
seven Project 4 cities.  Standardized quality control questions were used in every interview by 
the interview team members.  After the interviews were performed team members met to discuss 
the findings and ensure consistent interpretations of findings.  Standard qualitative methods were 
used essentially as a modified Delphi Panel to ensure objectivity and reliability in the findings.   
Detailed interviews were performed with homicide investigators, homicide supervisors, 
homicide commanders and “other police personnel” to determine the tactics and strategies they 
performed that led to their clearance successes.  “Other police personnel” varied between 
agencies and were identified based upon the unique programs or initiatives of each jurisdiction.  
For example, in jurisdictions where analysts were used extensively in homicide investigations, 
the analysts were interviewed.  In jurisdictions that had a large number of gang homicides and 
gang investigators aided homicide investigations, the gang unit members were interviewed.  
Interviewing “other police personnel” who provided direct support of homicide investigations 
permitted a more granular understanding of the investigative successes.  At the end of each site 
visit interview session, the supervisor and investigator were asked to “walk through” the first 48 
hours of a homicide investigation and describe the specific tasks their unit performed, with an 
estimate of the time frame in which each task was performed.  It is estimated that there were 
approximately 120 total interview hours in this project. 
 
Notes on the Methodology   
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As noted previously, this is qualitative research which used document analysis and 
interviews in each of the four projects.  The law enforcement agencies selected in the study were 
purposive because the goal was to assess what policies and practices worked and what did not in 
order to define successful policy and practice.  The current study utilized semi-structured 
interviews with key investigative personnel to develop a process map of successful homicide 
investigation practices.  Process mapping, as developed out of the scientific management school 
of thought (Taylor, 1911), allows for detail to be applied to the sequence and flow of 
complicated tasks that in sum are required to achieve desired ends. Such an approach is ideal for 
examining successful homicide investigation practices and has been employed by other scholars 
to quantify police investigations generally (Robinson & Tilley, 2009) and homicide investigation 
processes more specifically (Innes, 2002).  A homicide investigation consists of a complex array 
of tasks that must be performed, initially, over a short period of time, often under significant 
stress. The tasks are further complicated because they must meet a range of legal standards, 
conform to scientific integrity for later forensic analysis, or require dealing with challenging 
human relationships.  Other tasks are influenced by external pressures – such as the community 
or elected officials – to ensure that the tasks are performed quickly, accurately, and successfully.  
In quantitative research one typically seeks to define representative samples and perform 
inferential analysis to understand and interpret phenomena.  This is not typically the case in 
qualitative research.  Rather, qualitative inquiry seeks to understand the exceptions to the rule. 
Findings seek to understand “what can be” and “what is” rather than infer “what might be”. 
Generalizability of the findings is not a core goal of this type of research.  Rather documentation 
of key variables and practices and their effects for replication by other agencies is the core 
component of the research.  The policy findings from this research can lead to more successful 
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homicide investigations, more successful prosecutions and in some cases the prevention of 
homicide. 
The contrasts among the projects were important.  Projects 2 and 3 demonstrated clearly 
what did not work and provide important lessons for all agencies.  Projects 1 and 4 identified 
successes in investigative strategies as well as organizational and management practices which, 
in some cases, support a re-engineered investigative function.  These agencies accomplished 
functional results of increased clearance rates and in some cases prevention of future homicides. 
While the integration of four projects’ methods as the basis for research findings is admittedly 
not traditional, the findings would not have otherwise so clearly emerged to demonstrate 
successful practices.   
As one simple example, in Projects 1 and 4 an important part of the investigative 
practices was to perform a comprehensive neighborhood canvass to seek information from 
citizens in some detail about the homicides.  These were not simple “knock and talk” exercises 
but discussions with citizens that often included a community-based patrol officer who citizens 
knew and trusted.  In virtually every case, the neighborhood canvass yielded some type of 
information – sometimes innocuous – that contributed to the successful investigation and case 
development.  In Projects 2 and 3 neighborhood canvasses were rarely performed and when they 
were used the process was superficial.  In both Projects 2 and 3 investigators made statements 
that the canvass was a “waste of time”, “nobody talks to the police” and “the community does 
not trust us”.  Not only does this reinforce the value of this methodology to add context to the 
findings, in this case for the neighborhood canvass, but also the importance for the police 
department to lay a solid community-based foundation for this practice to be successful. 
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Homicide Process Mapping – Cities of Study 
The Project 1 jurisdictions were used largely as a benchmark and pointer for variables to 
be explored in future study.  The project was intended for policy demonstration, not research.  As 
such, it lacked detail in data collection; however, it produced descriptive reports on projects that 
stimulated further inquiry.  In addition, it also served as a rudimentary comparative control 
resource for later projects.  The key findings produced in this paper were found in Project 4 
where the methodology could be more controlled and greater focused information could be 
collected.  Moreover, in Project 4 all jurisdictions visited could be identified. 
The baseline criterion for selecting jurisdictions in this project was that the jurisdiction 
had at least 24 homicides and a homicide clearance rate greater than 80 percent in 2011.  To 
provide a snapshot of the agencies included in the current study, Tables 1, 2, and 3 depict city 
population and homicide metrics.  Population data were collected from the U.S. Census Bureau, 
homicide data from the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Uniform Crime Reporting 
(UCR) data, and agency-specific homicide clearance data was provided by the FBI upon request. 
The number of homicide investigators represents sworn personnel assigned exclusively to 
homicide investigations and includes all ranks.  This number does not include cold case squads 
because their investigative methodology is significantly different than active homicide 
investigations. 
An oddity of homicide clearance rates is that the clearance rate can exceed 100 percent 
(such as the case with San Diego noted in Table 2) because of the UCR methodology. 
Homicides may be cleared that were committed in a previous year, hence increasing the 
clearance rate for the subsequent year.  For example, a homicide committed on December 31, 
2013, will count in the 2013 homicide crime rate.  If the person who committed the homicide is 
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arrested the next day – on January 1, 2014 – the clearance by arrest will be counted in the 2014 
homicide clearance data.  Median statistics are presented since the Houston Police Department 
represents an outlier that positively skews the data.  As shown in Table 1, agencies included in 
the study serve a median population of 869,602 and have a median sworn employment of 1,645 
officers with a median of 21 homicide investigators.  From 2008-2010, the median agency 
averaged 38 homicides, which equated to 5.48 homicides per 100,000 population, with an 
average clearance rate of 87 percent as shown in Table 2.  Lastly, since these seven agencies 
were selected based on 2011 homicide data, information for this specific year is provided in 
Table 3.  In 2011, the median agency encountered 36 homicides, which equated to 5.48 
homicides per 100,000 population, with an average clearance rate of 85.3 percent.  
[ Table 1 approximately here ] 
[ Table 2 approximately here ] 
[ Table 3 approximately here ] 
Discussion of Findings 
Findings from the seven cities are organized and presented here within two organizational 
components: strategies and tactics.  Specifically within policing, research has demonstrated that 
these two aspects of organizational practice should be the focus of applying evidence-based 
practices for achieving enhanced processes and outcomes (Lum, 2009). Strategies are related to 
the operational foundation of the agency.  They are typically long-term applications of policing 
philosophy that can be generally applied to the entire organization or specifically applied to a 
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particular function, such as homicide investigation.  Strategies dictate the direction of all 
organizational initiatives; they represent the predicate for the way a task is approached and 
decisions are made.  Tactics are task-oriented.  They prescribe what investigative activities will 
be performed and how they will be performed in order to accomplish an objective.  Tactics are 
specifically defined activities needed to implement the strategy.   
This project identifies both strategies and tactics that have been demonstrated in the site 
visit agencies to successfully increase homicide clearance rates. There were a number of factors 
that were consistently prominent in the successful law enforcement agencies.  These factors were 
identified by the successful agencies as being critical to their success.  By contrast, these same 
factors were non-existent, or minimally employed, in the unsuccessful agencies (i.e., Projects 2 
and 3), supporting validation in the findings. The most critical findings – which represent a wide 
array of issues – are discussed below from their application of being strategic or tactical issues. 
While there is always some overlap, the categorization is for the core application of the practice 
as it relates to homicide clearances.  
Strategic Issues 
Staffing.  Adequate staffing requires a sufficient number of investigators to rapidly 
respond to immediate callouts when a homicide is discovered and to adequately conduct the 
crime scene and follow-up investigations.  While a range of different models exist, an optimum 
squad size is one supervisor and four investigators, with investigators rotating as the lead 
investigators.  The number of squads is at an optimum when given the annual number of 
homicides in a jurisdiction, each investigator is the lead investigator for three homicides per 
year.4  At first impression, this number may seem low; however there are several factors that lead 
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to this conclusion.  The lead investigator typically has a number of responsibilities on a case that 
other investigators do not.  These include managing the information flow and the case file, 
briefing supervisors and commanders on the status of cases, meetings with the District 
Attorney’s office on the investigation, meetings with the medical examiner, meetings with 
forensic analysts, as well as a wide array of other case management responsibilities.  In addition, 
the lead investigator will be responding to homicide scenes and providing investigative support 
to other cases.  Finally, in virtually all homicide units studied, investigators had other cases they 
would be assigned – such as officer involved shootings, suicides, suspicious deaths and/or 
kidnapping.  These would be additional cases that typically were not as detailed and labor-
intensive as homicide investigations.  Hence, while the optimum number of cases for an 
investigator to serve as lead may by three cases a year; there are many other responsibilities in 
the investigator’s portfolio. 
An alternate model, less frequently used but very effective, is the team approach.  Under 
this model, there is no lead investigator in the traditional sense.  Rather the different tasks 
required in the investigation are divided among the team members, usually based on expertise. 
Thus, in each homicide case team members would perform fundamentally the same tasks.  A 
Project 4 agency that uses this model found it very effective because it built on the strength of 
each investigator’s skills and consequently investigators worked more quickly and effectively.  A 
critical issue, however, is selecting and assigning Investigators with the skill sets needed for each 
team – a sometimes challenging requirement.  
Staff scheduling.  Scheduling of investigators should be based on crime analysis. 
Homicide investigators in Projects 2 and 3 were scheduled to work the day shift.  In Project 3 
there were one or two investigators assigned to work evenings (4:00 PM – Midnight), but they 
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largely responded to inquiries and handled some follow-up investigations.  In both Projects 2 and 
3, when a homicide was reported, the homicide squad that was to handle the next case would be 
called in from off-duty.  In both cases the Investigators would have to go from home to police 
headquarters, meet their partners, gather their equipment and pick up a police vehicle to respond 
to the scene.  Consequently a great deal of time was lost – and perhaps evidence and witnesses 
were also lost – as a result of this staffing model.  The agencies in Projects 1 and 4 all had full 
homicide investigation squads assigned both in the day and the evening.  In some cases a 
homicide investigation squad was also assigned to the midnight shift.  The assignments of 
Project 1 and 4 agencies were made based on crime analysis to have investigators readily 
available at peak times for a faster start to the investigation.  (It also cost less in overtime if a 
squad was already on-duty, rather than having to be called in.)  Thus, analytic-based scheduling 
can make the investigation more robust – particularly in those critical initial hours of the 
response.  It is also a more efficient method thereby saving money by reducing overtime. 
Training and professional development.  Optimum training and preparation for the 
position of homicide investigator is a minimum of three years as a patrol officer followed by at 
least two years as a detective with general investigative experience.  Upon selection as a 
homicide investigator the preferred process is to assign the new investigator to a seasoned 
detective for a field training process (or mentorship) of three months.  In addition, minimal 
training for the new investigator on death investigation, homicide crime scene investigation, and 
interviewing and interrogation is recommended.   
One Project 4 agency had a particularly successful professional development model for 
homicide investigators.  Any officer who had an interest in eventually being selected to the 
homicide investigation unit had to first work as an aggravated assault investigator.  The 
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investigative process is very similar to a homicide investigation so the investigator begins 
developing the skills needed for a homicide assignment.  In addition, homicide investigators 
would mentor aggravated assault investigators to guide them professionally and to get to know 
them so the best prospects for a new homicide investigator would be known when a vacancy 
became available. 
An effective foundation.  It is generally recognized that the critical time interval for 
identifying suspects, witnesses and evidence is the first 48 hours after a homicide is reported.  A 
core question in Project 4 was, “What investigative techniques employed in the first 48 hours 
after a homicide has been reported is critical to a successful investigation?”  As noted previously, 
the findings suggest that the key issue was not “what” tasks were performed, but “how 
effectively” they were performed.  As consistently reported in Project 4 interviews, the key 
elements of importance for a homicide investigation during the first 48 hours rests on four 
points: 
• If the suspect has not been apprehended or killed at the scene, collect as much
information as possible about the suspect’s identity and behavior because of the
likelihood that the suspect is still in a reasonable proximity and is moving away from the
scene rather than hiding.
• Identify and take statements from witnesses before they leave the area and cannot be
located, while memories are more accurate and before witnesses can begin comparing
observations or stories.
• Identify and collect critical evidence for later analysis before the evidence is
contaminated or lost.
• Understand the motive and manner of death to provide direction for the investigation and
interviews of suspects and witnesses.
As intuitively logical as these four points appear, they consistently eluded practice in the
Projects 2 and 3 agencies. 
These factors rely on a community who trusts and support the police and are therefore 
willing to talk with investigators and/or voluntarily provide information to the police.  If there is 
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a barrier of distrust that precludes widespread substantive information gathering, the 
investigation will be limited.  This barrier even extends to anonymous tips.  For example, all 
Project 4 agencies reported the value of Crime Stoppers programs and other anonymous tip 
methods, such as a dedicated phone line or anonymous tip form on a web site.  The Project 2 and 
3 agencies stated that “Crime Stoppers and tip lines have little value”.  These agencies simply 
lacked the community support because the foundation had not been laid.  Importantly, this 
foundation is laid by the tone of the police administration and the commitment of officers 
department-wide over an extended period of time. 
Crime and intelligence analysis.  The evidence clearly shows the use of an analyst can 
significantly support a successful homicide investigation.  The agency in Project 2, a major U.S. 
city, had two crime analysts for the department as a whole and no intelligence analysts.  The 
Project 3 agency, with some 18,000 sworn officers, had three intelligence analysts to serve the 
entire agency and no crime analysts.  Conversely, all of the homicide units in the Projects 1 and 4 
agencies had access to both crime and intelligence analysts5 with most of the agencies having an 
analyst assigned directly to the homicide unit.  One homicide commander stated that the first 
person he calls when notified of a homicide is usually the analyst.  In two other agencies, an 
intelligence analyst responds to homicide scenes.  It was explained that the investigators were 
focused on detecting evidence to identify the perpetrator.  However, the analyst tended to view 
the crime scene from a broader perspective, looking for causal elements – such as other 
offenders, known crime hot spot in the vicinity, environmental factors – that could provide more 
insight for both the investigator and for preventing future violence.   For example, in Richmond, 
Virginia since most of the homicides had a gang nexus, an important responsibility of the analyst 
was to do a threat assessment for a retaliation homicide by gang members.  All of the agencies in 
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Projects 1 and 4 used analysis for investigative support, ongoing threat definition, and/or pattern 
analysis of homicide trends. 
Equipment and resources.  Not surprisingly, successful investigations required the access 
to tools to facilitate the investigation.  According to the interviews, basic tools and resources 
include a cell phone, camera, digital recorder, rubber gloves, departmental take-home car (at 
least on days when the investigator is on call), laptop computer, interview room with audio and 
video recording, and access to computerized information systems (both governmental and 
commercial) that can aid in tracking suspects and witnesses.  All of the agencies in Projects 1 
and 4 had this minimal equipment and typically much more.  Investigators consistently reported 
the value of not only having these basic resources but also having them readily available.  For 
example, if a homicide investigator was on call and did not have a take-home vehicle, the 
investigator would have to respond from home to the police station, pick up a car and then 
respond to the scene.  This was the case in the Project 3 agency, which in some cases due to the 
size of the jurisdiction took two-three hours for the investigator to arrive at the crime scene.  As 
another example, when an investigator is in the field it is much faster and more effective if the 
investigator can use a laptop computer to access critical information systems rather than return to 
the office.  While seemingly logical, the Project 2 and 3 agencies did not have most of this basic 
equipment. 
In Project 2, investigators had cars that could be taken home when on call, depending 
where the Investigator lived.  Investigators had digital recorders, but they were of different types 
– some personally purchased – many of which required different types of software to download.
Investigators had no laptop computers and did not have access to any information systems other 
than the department’s propriety records management system and the National Crime Information 
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Center (NCIC).  While there were two interview rooms in the homicide unit office area, the 
recording equipment was broken in both rooms. 
In Project 3, despite this being a large major agency, investigators had no cell phones 
(most use their personal phone), no take home cars, no cameras or recording equipment, no 
laptop computers and minimal computers in the homicide office, limited interview rooms, none 
of which had recording equipment.  A number of investigators reported they purchased their own 
materials to make a “crime scene response kit” for even the most basic items as rubber gloves 
and hand cleaner.  The department had no computerized case management system – so all case 
files were paper – and investigators had no access to computerized information systems. 
In Projects 2 and 3 the limited (or no) resources simply made the investigators’ work more 
difficult, more time-consuming and less productive, particularly in those critical first hours after 
the response.  Beyond the productivity issues, the lack of equipment and resources also reduced 
morale and, in the eyes of investigators, de-valued their work.  As one Project 2 Investigator 
stated, “Nobody cares what we do.”  The failure to provide investigators the minimal equipment 
and resources jeopardizes public safety and deprives victims of justice.  Beyond depriving 
investigators of the tools to perform their jobs effectively, this dysfunction sends a message, 
intended or not, to investigators from administrators that their work and responsibilities are not 
valued. 
Tactical Issues 
Understanding the character of homicides.  An important analytic question is, “What is 
the nature of homicides in the jurisdiction?”  The answer should indicate if there is a notable 
criminogenic trend of homicides within the community that is accounting for a disproportionate 
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number of deaths.  The most common examples are gang-related homicides and drug-related 
homicides.  Understanding the unique characteristics of these homicide patterns can contribute to 
both an increase in homicide clearance rates and the prevention of future of homicides. 
Investigative resources from gang and drug enforcement units can provide invaluable insight for 
narrowing the focus of suspects as well as to gain additional information from their criminal 
informants.  Working as a team expedites a successful investigation.   
In all of the Project 1 and 4 agencies, homicide investigators reported that they work 
regularly with specialized investigative units when there was an overlap with a homicide 
investigation.  Two agencies reported that whenever there was a drug or gang-related homicide, 
an investigator from the appropriate unit would be assigned to the homicide investigation team 
on the case for up to 72 hours, depending on the status of the case and the facts.  Project 3 
homicide investigators stated that sometimes they worked with investigators of other units, but 
the practice varied and was not institutionalized.  Project 2 homicide investigators fundamentally 
dismissed the idea of working with specialized units.  One homicide investigator from Project 2 
state, “Narcs just get in the way at a homicide investigation.  People who think they would be 
useful just don’t understand what we do.” 
Patrol and uniformed officers.  In successful agencies the first responding uniformed 
officers were trained to identify, detain and conduct a preliminary interview of suspects and 
witnesses; they identified and protected forensic evidence and often performed a neighborhood 
canvass, often before the homicide investigators arrived.  Consistently, agencies in Projects 1 and 
4 stressed the importance of first responders being proactive – their actions essentially created a 
platform of information from which the Investigators launched their investigation.  In Projects 2 
and 3, the first responders were essentially, as characterized by one investigator, “place holders”.  
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The inferred view was that uniformed officers did not have the skill and competence to perform 
the preliminary investigation tasks and their role was essentially to secure the scene and do little 
more. 
As one example of an expanded role of first responding uniformed officers, a patrol 
sergeant in a Project 4 agency said “the crime scene is mine until the homicide investigators 
arrive.”  Recognizing the importance of witnesses, this agency had patrol officers immediately 
interview witness on their patrol car video cameras to ensure more accurate statements and have 
a video record in case witnesses later changed their stories.  In the same agency, homicide 
investigators had prepared a “homicide callout checklist” which patrol officers used to guide 
their preliminary investigation and record all essential information.  Each responding patrol 
officer completed the checklist and was debriefed by the Patrol Sergeant to clarify any issues. 
The patrol sergeant would then meet with the homicide team on their arrival to brief the 
investigators and give them the checklists.  All agreed this was an effective approach to enhance 
investigations.  In another Project 4 agency, the initial responding patrol officer would be 
assigned to the homicide investigation team (in plain clothes) for the first 48-72 hours of the 
investigation.  The rationale was that the patrol officer knew the people and geography of the 
area that would expedite the investigation.  Beyond assisting the investigation, this was also seen 
as a professional development opportunity for patrol officers. 
Crime Scene Investigators.6  The need for both an effective and responsive forensic 
evidence capability has shown to be critical for successful homicide investigations and 
prosecutions.  The first portion of this capability is to have trained and equipped crime scene 
investigators (CSI) who can recognize and collect crime scene evidence.  The most successful 
homicide investigations have CSI personnel who are staffed on peak call shifts and have 
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homicide calls as their top response priority.  Moreover, the relationship (and confidence in 
competence) between crime scene investigators and homicide investigators are also important 
ingredients for success.  Project 3 had minimal CSI’s available to cover a high crime and large 
geographic area.  Investigators sometimes waited as long three hours for the CSI to arrive. 
Moreover, evidence was often compromised or destroyed during the wait between dispatch and 
arrival of the CSI.  Also in Project 3, homicide investigators had limited confidence in the 
competence of CSI’s, hence the crime scene investigators only collected evidence at the specific 
direction of the homicide investigators.   
Conversely, Project 4 agencies staffed the CSI’s during the day and evening shifts and 
had CSI’s on call during off hours.  More importantly, in all of the Project 4 agencies homicide 
investigators reported a great deal of confidence in the competence of crime scene investigators.  
As such, CSI’s and homicide investigators communicated during the initial response and usually 
did a “walk through” of the crime scene looking for evidence.  Following this the CSI’s tended to 
process the scene independently of homicide investigators.  After the scene was processed there 
was usually a conference between CSI and homicide investigators at the scene to describe what 
had been found and determine if further processing was needed and types of evidence to be 
sought.  In one Project 4 agency, the same team of CSI’s and homicide investigators were 
scheduled for the same days and shifts to ensure they worked together on every case.  The 
investigators stated this significantly enhanced coordination and efficiency of the investigations. 
Forensics laboratory.  The second element of successful forensic support for homicide 
investigations was to have an effective and responsive crime laboratory.  All law enforcement 
agencies in all four projects had access to an accredited crime laboratory.7  There was a mixture 
in the structure of the crime laboratories; some were part of the law enforcement agency while 
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others were part of a different organizational entity.  In all cases homicide investigators also had 
access to a “back-up” laboratory, oftentimes a private laboratory, to be used only in “special 
circumstances”.  Ironically, the crime laboratories in both Projects 2 and 3 were among the 
newest, had some of the best equipment and were professionally staffed, although both appeared 
to be somewhat understaffed based on the case load.  Both of the Project 2 and 3 crime 
laboratories were organizationally independent of the law enforcement agency and the police 
executive in the respective jurisdictions appeared to have no influence over the laboratories 
operations or priorities.   
The Project 2 crime laboratory staff limitation was exclusively financial.  Beyond 
staffing, the crime laboratory had a strict “first in, first out” policy for all evidence.  Except in the 
rarest of cases, the forensic analysis of any case did not violate this policy.  Homicide 
investigators argued that homicides should take priority in forensic analysis because of the 
seriousness and public threat of the crime.  The crime laboratory responded that they were to 
serve the entire agency and “that every unit advocated their cases needed priority”.   
The Project 3 crime lab was understaffed because the laboratory director candidly stated 
that he wanted stay within – or under – the fixed budget and would not ask for additional analyst 
positions because they wanted to demonstrate that the laboratory was fiscally austere.  Moreover, 
the laboratory director appeared to be more responsive to the District Attorney’s Office than the 
police department.  As a result, except in unusually high profile cases, the Project 3 crime 
laboratory would only do forensic analysis of evidence that was going to court, not on evidence 
to support an investigation.  Thus, while Projects 2 and 3 had competent accredited crime 
laboratories, their support for homicide investigations was unexpectedly tepid.   
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Conversely, the agencies in Project 4 had crime labs that were responsive to homicide 
investigators.  Several Project 4 agencies reported that in homicide cases, they regularly got 
preliminary DNA analysis returned within 48 hours because the laboratory knew the importance 
of the results to support the investigation.8  The lesson learned is that a competent well-equipped 
and well-staffed crime laboratory that is not responsive to investigators will have a limiting 
effect on homicide clearances.  Conversely, a crime laboratory that is “customer driven” and 
views itself as part of the investigation team – rather than an independent agency – can be an 
important factor for both the investigation and the trial. 
Team approach.  During the reform era of policing (Kelling & Moore 1988) there was 
growing professionalism in all aspects of policing responsibilities and a growing emphasis on 
specialization.  Homicide investigations were reflected in this trend in several ways, in particular 
through the growing vision that homicide investigators were the “first among equals” reflecting 
the best and brightest investigators.  As such, homicide investigators tended to have a superior 
perspective of their role and viewed other police units simply as having a support role to aid 
homicide investigators in solving their crimes.  Indeed, this was clearly the perspective of 
homicide investigators in the agency of Project 2.  Given the nature of complex criminality and 
the vast expertise that has been developed by law enforcement personnel in all assignments, this 
“first among equals” perspective of homicide investigators is simply not pragmatic. 
The agencies in Projects 1 and 4 tended to use an evidence-based approach to 
investigations requiring diverse sources of information and expertise.  Investigators realized that 
homicides which were linked to other types of criminal activity – most notably drug trafficking 
and gangs – could be more effectively investigated by using the knowledge and informants of 
other units.  As such, these agencies tended to use a team approach to investigations.  As an 
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example, a homicide unit supervisor from a Project 4 agency stated that if they had a gang-
related homicide, a gang unit investigator would be assigned to the homicide investigation team 
until the case was cleared or leads were exhausted.  Not only does this approach provide ad hoc 
expertise to the investigation team, it was a more efficient use of human resources, particularly 
as agencies downsized during financial exigency.9  The most successful homicide investigators 
realized the value provided in a team approach to investigations and practiced it regularly. 
Among Project 4 agencies, the most common units to work with homicide investigators were 
auto theft, drugs, gangs, vice, domestic violence, gun crime unit, and a fugitive or major crimes 
unit. 
Working with external agencies.  Much like the traditional reluctance to work with other 
units within the law enforcement agency, historically homicide investigators resisted working 
with outside agencies – the investigators seemed to view it as a matter of professional pride that 
they were able to solve the crimes.  While there is a role for pride in one’s work, the greater good 
is served by utilizing all resources necessary to clear a homicide for both justice and public 
safety.  All agencies in the study showed some evidence of working with outside agencies, 
however those in Projects 1 and 4 were most proactive and most effective.  For example, 
homicide investigators in an agency in Project 1 and Project 4 regularly included an agent from 
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) for investigations of gang 
homicides.  All Project 4 agencies reported they regularly used a fusion center as a resource in 
investigations.10  Agencies also reported working with neighboring law enforcement 
jurisdictions, probation and parole, the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) 
intelligence center and various federal agencies.  The critical factor learned was that when 
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working with specialized law enforcement agencies, corrections organizations and contiguous 
law enforcement agencies, the probability of clearing a homicide notably increased.  
The Project 2 and 3 agencies stated they often contacted the ATF and DEA for assistance 
in homicide investigations, however, they stated they received limited information of value from 
these contacts.  Follow-up with federal agencies in both jurisdictions acknowledged some 
information sharing.  Further, individual discussions with some federal agents acknowledged a 
“distrust” of the Project 2 and 3 agencies.  These findings are consistent with limited research to 
date examining local police and their cooperative relationships for sharing information (Carter, 
2014) and engaging in research (Alpert, Rojek & Hansen, 2009).  Information sharing and 
assistance cannot be assumed, but must be earned through professional competence of the 
agency.11 
Fugitive squads.  Three of the Project 4 agencies had a specialized unit that was designed 
to track and locate people.  Using different names, these units conducted extensive surveillance, 
worked criminal informants, monitored social media, searched a wide array of commercial and 
law enforcement data bases and networked with other agencies to locate people.  These units, 
which would search for both suspects and reluctant witnesses, were surprisingly successful and 
were relied on heavily by homicide investigators.  This left investigators more time for case 
development and case management. 
District or prosecuting attorney.  While an arrest will clear the homicide for purposes of 
the Uniform Crime Report, the ultimate goal is to successfully prosecute a homicide suspect. 
Prosecuting attorneys view the investigation process somewhat differently than investigators. 
While investigators seek information to identify and apprehend the offender, prosecutors seek 
information that can identify, apprehend, and convict the offender.  Given the requirements to 
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meet their burden of proof in court, prosecutors seek a greater amount of evidence which can 
also withstand constitutional scrutiny.  These distinctions sometimes place homicide 
investigators and prosecutors in conflict.  In both Projects 2 and 3, the conflict between the two 
was palpable.  Having interviewed prosecutors as well as investigators, both consistently 
complained about the competence of the other.  Conversely, the agencies in Projects 1 and 4 
established a cooperative relationship with their District Attorneys’ offices.  In some cases 
prosecutors respond to homicide crime scenes, in other cases a prosecutor is assigned to a police 
homicide unit, in another model the District Attorney’s office has specifically designated 
homicide prosecutors.  In each case, a model was developed that met the needs of the jurisdiction 
with the investigators and prosecutors having an open, functional relationship.  The consequence 
is not only an increase in clearances but also increased successful prosecutions.  
Medical examiner.  Understanding the causes and circumstances of death is a key 
component in the investigation process.  The greatest successes show that this is enhanced when 
there is close direct communications between homicide investigators and the medical examiner’s 
office.  In Projects 1 and 4, the lead homicide investigator was always present during the victim’s 
autopsy and was able to not only discuss the autopsy results, but ask specific questions during 
the autopsy that would help direct certain aspects of the examination.  Investigators agreed that 
this was a critical component in the investigation.  In Project 2, homicide investigators 
sporadically observed the autopsy and had a somewhat contentious relationship with the medical 
examiner.  In Project 3, homicide investigators never attended an autopsy and rarely spoke to a 
medical examiner.  Rather, they relied solely on the medical examiner’s report.  Without a close 
and cooperative information sharing relationship with the medical examiner’s office, the 
investigators can miss important clues to direct the investigation. 
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Victim-witness advocate.  The use of victim-witness advocates emerged on a large scale 
in the 1970s with responsibilities to protect rights of victims and witnesses of criminal acts.  
Historically, homicide investigators have had limited interaction with victim witness advocates, 
often limited to a referral.  Oftentimes the victim-witness advocate is located in the District 
Attorney’s office although some police departments also have an advocate.  The use of victim 
and witness advocates in policing is reflective of the community policing movement wherein 
police agencies are open to avenues and partnerships beyond traditional law enforcement 
practices.  In Richmond, for example, the homicide unit embraced the victim-witness advocate as 
a resource to support the investigation.  Investigators worked closely with members of the 
victim’s family to not only collect information for the investigation but to also help the family 
recover from the trauma of victimization.  This increased the amount of information that was 
obtained from the family, often leading to faster arrest – families often had more information 
about offenders than they originally told police -- many times not knowing the information 
would be of value to the investigation.  An offshoot of this program was that there were fewer 
complaints from the victim’s family about investigative and prosecutorial actions.  One of the 
challenges to overcome was the re-socializing of investigators to have a community orientation – 
this was a different role for Investigators which did not evolve easily. 
In Denver the Victim-Witness Advocate’s office had thirty-eight staff members, funded 
by a fee assessment on every criminal conviction within the jurisdiction.  Beyond being 
proactive in establishing relationships with victims’ families and witnesses, all of which 
increases the information flow to investigators, the office also provides witness relocation when 
necessary.  The investigators have access to the protected witness which further supports the 
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investigation.  While this is an atypical Vitim-Witness Advocate Office, it nonetheless illustrates 
the value of this function. 
Crime Stoppers and citizen tips.  All homicide investigators interviewed from all 
agencies agreed on the importance of tips from citizens to aid the investigation.  The notable 
difference was the Project 2 and 3 agencies received relatively few tips while Project 1 and 4 
agencies reported regularly receiving tips (many of which had limited value) from citizens after a 
homicide.  The differences appear to be based in the community support for and trust in the law 
enforcement agency.  Somewhat surprising to the researchers was the importance given to the 
Crime Stoppers program in the Project 1 and 4 agencies.  The Project 2 agency had Crime 
Stoppers, but reported that it had limited value.  There was no Crime Stoppers program in the 
Project 3 agency, although it did have a “tip line”.  While the enthusiasm for Crime Stoppers 
varied among the agencies, all agreed that it was a positive resource for homicide investigations. 
Once again, these agencies also tended to have generally strong community support which is an 
important factor in the value of Crime Stoppers.  
Technology investigations and analysis.  Technology is part of the daily life of most 
Americans.  Cell phones, computer memory, e-mail, use of social media, online shopping and 
search engine queries are a few of the common elements of a person’s daily routine. 
Consequently they can provide valuable information in a homicide investigation about both the 
victim and suspect.  For agencies in Projects and 1 and 4, forensic analysis of technologies was 
part of almost every homicide investigation.  Several agencies reported that when a homicide 
was reported, lead investigators routinely requested “data dumps” from the cell phone towers 
that overlap the crime scene while responding to the scene.12  Cell phones of victims and 
suspects were always analyzed and a forensic analysis of digital evidence was performed in 
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virtually every investigation where a victim or suspect’s computer was found.  Investigators 
interviewed from these agencies consistently pointed to the value of digital evidence – and in 
particular information in cell phone towers – as an important part of many investigations. 
Investigators in both Project 2 and Project 3 stated they did not have regular access to any 
form of forensic digital analysis.  Both stated in special cases they could request a forensic 
analysis from an outside agency (which tended to be slow) or commercial firm (which tended to 
be expensive).  Several of the investigators in Project 3 did not know what types of data could be 
gained from cell towers nor how to start the process with wireless carriers to get the information. 
Project 2 Investigators said they would get the information from cell towers “if warranted by the 
known facts”.  Investigators in both Project 2 and 3 agencies recognized the value of digital 
evidence and admitted in many instances it might strengthen and/or speed up the investigation. 
However, they rarely sought it because requests were cumbersome and often denied. 
Conclusions 
The current research focuses on the capabilities of seven agencies with high homicide 
clearance rates to document their successful attributes.  At the outset of this research, intuition 
would suggest that large agencies would have higher clearance rates because they have more 
resources and experience investigating homicides.  While resources and experience are part of 
the equation in explaining homicide clearance rates, their substantive role is limited.  Why are 
some agencies more successful at clearing homicides than others?  Based on the collective 
findings, the successful agencies had laid a solid foundation of community relationships and 
partnerships with other law enforcement agencies.  Indeed, it was repeatedly emphasized by 
homicide investigators the importance of having solid community relationships, particularly 
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through the use of community policing, to develop community-based trust during an 
investigation.  Similarly, they relied on contemporary developments in policing – such as the use 
of crime analysis and intelligence analysis – and developed an organizational ethos of working 
cooperatively. 
Moreover, the successfully agencies were more competent and had better capabilities. 
Competence includes staffing, training and the development of contemporary expertise, such as 
collecting digital evidence.  Similarly, the agencies provided investigators with the resources and 
equipment needed to perform successful investigations.  One of the interesting facets of police 
culture found in the successful agencies was the reliance on patrol officers to perform a wide 
range of tasks associated with the investigation.  Importantly, in these agencies patrol officers 
were viewed as partners in the investigation.  Can effective investigative practices prevent 
homicides?   The evidence suggests “yes” in some cases.  Effective investigations can eliminate 
repeat offenders and reduce the numbers of retaliation homicides.  While not the direct goal of 
homicide investigators, prevention can be an important artifact of a substantively strong 
investigation. 
The factors discussed above show an interesting trend of contrasts between the agencies 
in Projects 1 and 4 that had homicide clearance rates of 80 percent and higher versus the 
agencies in Projects 2 and 3 that had clearance rates of 35 percent and 22 percent respectively.  
In light of these factors, what are the implications for investigations to increase homicide 
clearances?  Fundamentally, for the homicide clearance rate to increase, the homicide unit needs 
to be adequately staffed with competent, qualifications-based investigators who are equipped 
with the tools to conduct an effective investigation.  Moreover, it is important to have strong 
support and an open relationship with the community, throughout the law enforcement agency 
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and with other law enforcement agencies in the region.  While these are easy principles to state, 
they are difficult to achieve because they require organizational and individual change for which 
there will always be some resistance to overcome.  Depending on the priority given to homicide 
clearances in the agency as well as the fiscal condition of the department, some resource re-
allocation may also be required – this is always a difficult process that creates new conflict if not 
handled adroitly.   
Further findings indicated that the role of the homicide investigator has also changed. 
The investigator is no longer simply “digging for information”, as was largely the vision of 
investigations in the professional era of policing.  Rather, the homicide investigator is 
increasingly becoming an information manager.  In the successful Project 1 and 4 agencies, the 
investigator was reaching out to a wide range of people in the department, in the community and 
in the region as well as a wide range of data bases in order to link them together to identify and 
apprehend the suspect.  This requires a broader range of skills which was evident in interviews at 
the successful agencies.  This is in comparison to the Project 2 and 3 agencies which led one 
research team member, who was a former homicide unit commander, to observe that, “It’s like 
the homicide unit is stuck in a time warp trying to solve a homicide only by ‘beating the 
pavement’ rather than networking.  It’s a different world.”  
Though an examination of the impact of extralegal factors believed to be influential on 
homicide clearance rates – such as victim race and incident geography – are outside the reach of 
the current research, the findings lend insight to the theoretical discussion of the value of police 
in the homicide investigatory process.  Jarvis et al. (2009) posit their interpretation of the police-
citizen interaction as one that puts the emphasis of perception on community members and not 
police.  More specifically, how community members perceive the value of police in the homicide 
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investigation process.  Jarvis et al. concluded that community members perhaps devalue the role 
of police in homicide investigations as they are one of many actors (i.e., medical examiner and 
prosecutors) in the homicide clearance process.  Jarvis and his colleagues further clarify this 
finding in the context of community mistrust in the police given the measurement of the variable 
in their study.  Both interpretations of the findings are in contrast to those presented here as each 
of the departments examined for their high clearance rates demonstrated exceptional cooperation 
and collaboration with community members via the victim-witness advocate and crime tips 
initiatives.  This finding lends support for the notion that community members value the role of 
police in the homicide clearance process.  This contrast in findings coupled with the 
measurement validity mentioned by Jarvis et al. (2009) perhaps signal an important focus of 
future inquiry in this area of the literature.   
Through the process of identifying the practices of successful homicide investigations 
that can be implemented by practitioners tasked to clear these incidents, the present research has 
also provided scholars with concepts that would benefit from a quantitative evidence-base.  
Future research should continue to quantifiably observe the effective investigative practices 
identified in this current research in an attempt to parse out sensitivities to variations in agency 
and community types.  More specifically, research which empirically examines the presence or 
absence of these investigative practices across agencies with varying levels of homicide 
clearance rates is a much needed contribution to the knowledge base.  A quantitative study would 
also allow for the inclusion of factors likely to influence homicide clearance rates; such as police 
department resources, officer training, detective workload, presence of victim-witness advocate, 
available evidence, information sharing with other agencies, strength of community policing, 
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variation in demographic and income census tracts, homicide circumstances related to other 
criminal activity, and differences across clearances by arrest and exception to name a few.   
In addition, scholars should seek to specifically understand how each unique agency 
operationalizes their clearance rate calculations.  Some agencies in the present study would not 
clear additional homicides by a single offender as they believed it would be “double counting.” 
For example, if an offender committed separate homicides over a course of time and was 
eventually convicted of just one of the homicides, some police departments would only clear one 
of the offender’s homicides despite knowing the offender committed more than the homicide for 
which he/she was convicted.   Though it is believed this is the exception rather than the rule, and 
that multiple-victims across different events are rare among homicide offenders, such erroneous 
clearance rate calculations could alter already sensitive inferential findings.  Lastly, scholars 
should examine the emerging multidisciplinary partnerships that are likely to facilitate practice 
and research of homicide clearance rates.  Such partnerships include cooperation among law 
enforcement, public health, community, and correctional institutions as the contemporary 
movement of the prevention and response to violence is dispersed across these areas. 
Notes 
1 For purposes of agreed upon confidentiality, specific city and county law enforcement agencies are not 
named.  This confidentiality only applies to the agency included in Project 2 and the agency in Project 3.  
The agencies identified within the tables provided consented to being named in the research.    
2 The uncontrolled factor that can influence the effects of the first 72 hours of the investigation is the 
amount of time that has passed between when the homicide occurred and when it was reported and police 
responded.  In most case, that time period did not have an effect on the investigation because the 
homicides were reported in a timely manner. 
3 The findings in this article are not a replication of the findings in the Homicide Process Mapping report.  
The BJA report is detailed and exclusively policy directed.  At the request of BJA, the process map was 
written in a prescriptive manner to be used by law enforcement policy makers to develop or refine 
homicide investigative procedures.  While the BJA report focuses procedurally on lessons learned, this 
article focuses on the findings and the reasons why these changes in homicide investigation increased 
clearances.  The BJA report can be found at http://fulltextreports.com/2013/11/21/homicide-process-
mapping-best-practices-for-increasing-homicide-clearances/. 
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4 Obviously this number is a guidepost, and not absolute, because it will be dependent on the nature of the 
cases.  For example, if the Investigator is designated as the Lead on a case that turns out to be a murder 
suicide, it will be cleared fairly quickly with much less time spent in meetings, briefings and report 
writing.  Hence, that Investigator should anticipate being the Lead on at least four homicides per year. 
5 In this context crime analysis is typically a quantitative assessment of crime patterns and attributes. 
Intelligence analysis is typically a qualitative analysis of current threats (tactical) and changes in the 
threat picture (strategic). 
6 All agencies in all four projects had Crime Scene Investigators (CSI’s), however, they used a wide range 
of different titles for the function (e.g., Field Forensic Technicians, Road Techs, and Forensic 
Investigators are examples.)  As a writing convention all are referred to as Crime Scene Investigators 
whose function is to search for, identify, collect, preserve, document, package and transport physical and 
forensic evidence from a crime scene. One Project 3 Homicide Investigator reported that at one crime 
scene there were no CSIs that responded and the Investigator did not have a camera.  As a result, the 
Homicide Investigator took the crime scene photographs with his personal iPhone. 
7 Crime laboratories are accredited to rigorous standards by the American Society of Crime Laboratory 
Directors (ASCLD) Laboratory Accreditation Board.  See http://www.ascld-lab.org/index.htm 
8 While it was documented that all Project 1 agencies had ready access to a crime laboratory, the details 
related to issues and processes at the laboratory were not addressed in any detail in that project as they 
were in the other projects. 
9 The Sheriff’s Office reflected in Project 4 agency that made this comment lost 400 deputy and jailor 
positions in 2009.  As a result the agency had to work smarter. 
10 When information was collected for Project 1 agencies, some reported using the fusion centers, 
however the fusion centers were comparatively new and less capable than they were in 2012 and 2013 
when Project 4 data were collected. 
11 Both Project 2 and 3 agencies had highly critical reports about their operations from the Civil Rights 
Division of the U.S. Department of Justice.  Both agencies also had officers who had been prosecuted for 
various criminal offenses, including a homicide. 
12 In most cases data in cell phone towers is only kept in memory – including GPS location of calls – for 
twenty-four hours.  Records of cell phone calls are typically kept by service providers for one year. 
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Tables 
Table 1:  Population and Sworn Officer Data 
Agency Population Sworn Personnel Homicide Investigators 
Baltimore County, MD, Police Department 817,455 1,877 15 
43 
Denver, CO, Police Department 619,968 1,420 13 
Houston, TX, Police Department 2,145,146 5,294 130 
Jacksonville, FL, Sheriff’s Office 869,602 1,645 31 
Richmond, VA, Police Department 205,533 727 21 
Sacramento County, CA, Sheriff’s Department 1,450,121 1,193 9 
San Diego, CA, Police Department 1,326,179 1,834 27 
Mean (Median) 1,062,001 (869,602) 1999 (1,645) 35 (21) 
Table 2:  2008–2010 Three-Year Average Homicide Incident and Homicide Clearance Data 
Agency 
2008–2010 
Average 
Number of 
Homicides 
2008–2010 
Average 
Homicides Per 
100,000 
2008–2010: 
3-Year Average 
Clearance Rate 
Baltimore County, MD, Police Department 27 3.30 91.0% 
Denver, CO, Police Department 34 5.48 80.0% 
Houston, TX, Police Department 283 13.19 82.0% 
Jacksonville, FL, Sheriff’s Office 98 11.27 76.0% 
Richmond, VA, Police Department 37 18.00 87.0% 
Sacramento County, CA, Sheriff’s Department 38 2.62 91.0% 
San Diego, CA, Police Department 41 3.09 115.0% 
Mean (Median) 80 (38) 8.14 (5.48) 89% (87%) 
Table 3:  2011 Homicide Incident and Homicide Clearance Data 
Agency 2011 Number of Homicides 
Homicides Per 
100,000 
2011 Clearance 
Rate 
Baltimore County, MD, Police Department 30 3.67 81.0% 
Denver, CO, Police Department 34 5.48 95.3% 
Houston, TX, Police Department 198 9.23 89.9% 
Jacksonville, FL, Sheriff’s Office 71 8.16 84.5% 
Richmond, VA, Police Department 36 17.52 80.0% 
Sacramento County, CA, Sheriff’s Department 33 2.27 85.3% 
San Diego, CA, Police Department 38 2.87 100.0% 
Mean (Median) 63 (36) 7.03 (5.48) 88.0% (85.3%) 
